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Introduction 
Ever since the earliest forms of mass media, the dichotomy of mass culture/popular arts and high 
culture/fine art has been a topic of debate. This discussion focuses on the value and use of different 
art forms and on different notions of and attitudes towards the purpose of art. Starting in the 1960s, 
studies on the value of popular culture got more attention, for example, from sociological studies 
and from the new research field of cultural studies (e.g. Willams 1958, Gans 1975, Escarpit 1958), a 
development that created a growing interest in the users. Further, the late modern society and the 
development of media and technology created discussions on cultural liberation (Ziehe, 1986) and 
fluid identity (Giddens 1991; Bauman 2000) and in cultural policy, talk about cultural democracy 
changed the discourse in most countries (Duelund 2003). With the latest developments in 
mediatization (Hjarvard 2010) and digitization of culture, we are experiencing a participation turn 
(Jenkins & Bertozzi 2008; Simon 2010), which again expands and challenges the way we think and 
practice cultural policy, cultural strategies and arts advocacy.  
History has given us a better understanding of people’s tastes and choices when it comes to art and 
culture (Bourdieu 1979; Gans 1974). It has further shown us, that despite this understanding, the 
democratization of culture has only to a smaller degree dissolved boundaries or respected different 
tastes when it comes to people’s preferred forms of culture (Petterson & Kern 1996; Bennett et al. 
2009; Mangset 2012).  
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Despite all these attempts to develop a broader understanding of culture and to acknowledge 
different ways of experiencing, valuing and participating in art and culture, cultural policy 
continues to reproduce dichotomies between high and popular culture, valuing the first over the 
latter.  In Denmark, where the authors are situated, an instrumental cultural policy has dominated 
the 20th Century and continues to rule on late modern media and digital conditions, especially, but 
not exclusively, when it comes to children and youth. Exposure to high culture is still considered an 
educational way to foster children into capable, creative and adaptable citizens (Ministry of Culture 
2014 a; 2014b; 2014c). The tendencies are also seen in the emphasis on social inclusion and 
outreach, such as exists in the UK (Kawashima 2006; Stevenson et al. 2015; Belfiora 2010), where 
outreach refers to strategies developed to reach vulnerable groups and thus contribute to social 
policy.  Art and culture are rarely understood as independent ways of experiencing meaning creation 
and creating value in everyday life.   
When it comes to cultural institutions, cultural promotion and art advocates, some of the same 
tendencies manifest themselves. The American communication professor Joli Jensen points at a 
widespread consensus among American arts advocates in relation to what she calls an “instrumental 
logic”: 
 “I found calls for the arts to somehow turn everyday people into an American 
populace that could be trusted to self-govern. This deep-seated mistrust of the 
American public as it currently exists leads to an inflated faith in the possibility of the 
“right” kind of culture to create (or restore) the “right” kind of citizen.” (…)” In this 
way art is defined as the non-mass-mediated cultural form that intellectuals appreciate 
and the masses ignore”. (Jensen 2003, 68) 
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Cultural institutions and their dissemination strategies do change, as they develop new methods to 
present and narrate the objects and stories they tell. This is for example seen in the aforementioned 
participation turn (e.g. Simon 2010), where cultural institutions develop a variety of options for 
users to participate, often using new media to facilitate the interaction. Still an instrumental logic as 
described by Jensen seems to dominate the cultural policy field, which makes us wonder. Why after 
all these years of research, debate, turns and developments, do we still rely on Cartesian 
dichotomies and oppositions? Why do we still maintain an instrumental cultural policy perspective, 
which excludes the taste of the majority of the populace? When we take into consideration the 
cultural institutions’ loss of authority, the cultural liberation and the participatory turn caused by 
media and digital technology, we might expect a cultural policy turn that points toward the 
contribution to negotiations on meaning, with value in our everyday life as an independent purpose.  
Our everyday expressive life is ruled by individual interests. The different interests gather and 
separate us as participants, audiences, readers, listeners, and viewers. Some prefer popular art forms 
while others choose high culture. We each choose particular activities and experiences because they 
make a difference to us—they contribute value and meaning to our everyday lives.       
Focus on the abovementioned studies has to a large degree concentrated on art forms and on user 
groups. The concept of cultural democracy has worked as a way to acknowledge and support a 
variety of cultural activities (Mulcahy 2010; Duelund 2003). In this article, we argue for an 
expanded understanding of cultural democracy, which not only acknowledges different tastes and 
cultures, but also includes the central perspective of giving voice and expression across interests 
and taste--the perspective of what we might call an expressive cultural democracy.  
We anticipate that the tenacious valuation of high culture as being beneficial to all is widespread as 
a way to legitimize the funding of cultural institutions, and contributes to a dearth of arguments 
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related to the independent value of art and culture itself. In this article, our goal is contribute to a 
new understanding of arts experience, which can serve as the point of departure for a turn of 
perspective on arts advocacy and cultural policy. Our point of departure is Joly Jensen who was the 
first to draw our attention to this paradox. We then include scholars who contribute to explain the 
paradox, but also help us develop a new understanding that points to the independent usefulness and 
value of cultural experiences. 
A new cultural policy perspective – an expressive logic 
The instrumental logic as coined by Jensen has dominated not only western cultural policy and arts 
advocacy throughout the 20th century, but also art education and art critique. It links the notion of 
art with a notion of literacy, determining the very meaning of cultural policy, arts advocacy and 
cultural communication as educational and therefore primarily addressing the part of the populace 
with popular, i.e. bad, tastes. Jensen points out that the instrumental logic leads to oppositions 
between art and culture, and between elite and popular taste. Since the elite taste belongs to the 
educated elite, who are in charge of policymaking, arts education, and arts advocacy, their taste 
ends up being the scale on which participation in art and cultural habits are measured. When we rely 
on this logic Jensen says, we “insult the very people we most need and hope to persuade.”  (Jensen 
2003, 71) 
 
Cultural policy and arts advocacy is thus turning art into what she calls ‘cultural spinach,’ 
something we know we ought to like, but that we (secretly) dislike. A literacy project turned against 
the collective Dionysus, devoted to the individual Apollo. As a conclusion and a vision she 
proposes to let go of the instrumental logic and to develop what she calls an expressive logic. 
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In her book, Is Art good for us? (2002) Joli Jensen combines her analysis with a radical strategy that 
inverts not only the educational goal of cultural policy as a whole, but also the communication form 
and the power and authority connected to instrumental thinking. Cultural dissemination, she claims, 
is not a form of one-way communication in which professionals educate and inspire non-
professionals. Instead, it is a process whereby meaning and values are under negotiation and where 
all of us are in charge. Inspired by the American philosopher John Dewey, she suggests a new 
notion on art that emphasizes and respects a variety of aesthetic experiences. Arts advocates and 
arts critics must surrender instrumental logic, and replace it with a more Deweyan expressive logic, 
in which art and art experiences are valuable in themselves (Jensen 2003, 77). Art is, she says, far 
from a one-way form of communication in which the passive receiver uncritically assimilates ideas 
and values from the sender. Instead, cultural participation is a conversation, a dialogue in which the 
receiver interacts with the sender and negotiates meaning. “ (…) arts are experiences, they are the 
human practice of communication, and therefore they are examples of valuable conjoint activity” 
(Jensen 2002, 174). 
       
By placing the users of art and culture and their different personal tastes and preferences in the 
center of cultural policy, arts advocacy and audience development consequently means that the 
classic cultural arenas – theatres, concert halls, cinemas, museums and libraries - are regarded as 
democratic participatory platforms for exchanging and negotiating meanings and values. This 
perspective turns both cultural policy and cultural dissemination away from an educational 
instrumental perspective governed by professional experts and towards an expressive perspective 
built on respect for, and the co-existence of, both elite and popular tastes.  
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“This is the way we should think about the social role of the arts. An expressive view of the arts, 
then, is a view that does not try to erase notions of high and low, authentic and commercial, arts and 
craft, sacred and profane. It presumes instead that these distinctions are important because they are 
important to the participants. Lines of demarcation between good and bad culture are endlessly 
being constructed, sustained, repaired and transformed. These distinctions matter, but they matter 
because they are part of an evaluative ritual – the ceremony of making and protecting worthiness. 
The arts are part of our vital ongoing conversation about what is valuable, human, exalted, sacred, 
pleasurable, challenging, and worthwhile and what is not. And that is why the arts are so important 
and so valuable.” (Jensen 2002, 199) 
 
Jensen is not only challenging an instrumental logic. Her expressive logic is at the same time an 
attack on the enlightenment tradition that developed both western cultural institutions and the 
instrumental logics that accompany those institutions’ educational practices. Both the instrumental 
logic and the inherent oppositions and dichotomies stem from rational philosophy built on the 
dichotomy between brain and body, reason and sense. To dissolve these dichotomies is not just a 
question of wish, will and cultural strategy development. If expressive logic should be able to guide 
cultural policy and cultural institutions for the future, both must be grounded in philosophy of 
aesthetics and surrounded by theories and notions that produce the kind of thinking and arguments 
needed to legitimize, implement and practice from them.  
 
Joli Jensen points at an expressive logic as a starting point, but leaves us wondering about the 
perseverance of the Cartesian oppositions, and the dichotomies between high and low. In order to 
strengthen our argument we include the philosopher and researcher Richard Shusterman, another 
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scholar who takes inspiration from Dewey (e.g. Shusterman 1997), and studies the historical and 
etymological basis for the valuation of different art forms and cultural experiences.  
 
A new perspective on art and popular culture – a concept of entertainment 
With his studies of artistic status and general cultural value of popular art, starting in the early 
1990’s, Richard Shusterman placed himself in the middle of the intellectual fight pro et contra art 
and popular culture that has divided philosophers and academics since antiquity. His studies 
illustrate why it is extremely difficult to create new perspectives and a change in perceptions about 
oppositions and dichotomies. All over the western world, we still think with and through them. 
Even when we are directly confronted with them, they tend to reproduce themselves in new ways. 
 
Reflecting on the many critical reactions to his work on popular art, Shusterman realizes that below 
the historical hierarchy between high and popular art forms lies an even more solid contrast 
between art versus entertainment (Shusterman 2003, 290).  His analysis starts out with a focus on 
the strategies that have formed theories and concepts of entertainment and popular art. The first, 
Shusterman says, places entertainment as subordinate to the field of high culture. Entertainment, or 
popular culture, borrows from it, but also corrupts it. The second places entertainment in opposition 
to high art, in a sphere of its own, with its own rules and norms. Neither seems adequate. Instead, 
Shusterman proposes 'meliorism' as a middle way between condemnation and celebration, a theory 
of entertainment that steers between mere subservience to and sheer defiance of high culture. 
(Shusterman 2003, 291)   
 
Shusterman starts by studying ’entertainment’ both in an etymological and a historical perspective. 
Comparing the etymological meanings related to 'entertainment' in French, English and German 
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languages, he finds a complexity. In all languages, he finds terms as ‘amusement’ and ‘distraction’ 
connected to the concept. In Latin the concept is inter + tenere, which means to hold together or to 
maintain. Shusterman argues that "The straightforward philosophical lesson implied by this 
etymology is that a good, if not necessary way, to maintain oneself is to occupy oneself pleasurably 
and with interest” (Shusterman 2003, 293). Looking further in to the complexity of the concept, 
Shusterman finds that the English and French terms of 'amusement', 'divertissement' and 'distraction' 
point in the direction of being absorbed in thought, to wonder, but also to waste time. The concepts 
seems to hold a dialectic of both focused attention (to maintain oneself) and distraction (to loose 
oneself). Shusterman concludes that “To sustain, refresh and even deepen concentration, one also 
needs to distract it; otherwise concentration fatigues itself and gets dulled through monotony." 
(Shusterman 2003, 293)   
 
Entertainment as a productive dialectic of focused attention and diversion, concentration and 
distraction, serious maintenance and playful amusement is the new notion he offers. It makes it 
possible to understand entertainment not as opposed to, but as a vital part of art, popular culture and 
everyday playing activities. Studying the concept's genealogy through a tour de force of texts from 
those by Plato and Aristotle, to those by Hegel, Kant, and Adorno, to contemporary critics who 
shape today’s understanding, he explains why this productive dialectic during the 18th, 19th and 20th 
centuries ended up simplifying oppositions and dichotomies. "Most cultural critics (…) sharply 
contrast art and entertainment identifying the latter with idle pleasure seeking and lower-class 
vulgarity". (Shusterman 2003, 301). Historically and traditionally, pleasure has been connected to 
the pleasure of the flesh and therefore stands opposed to mind and thought. Shusterman argues that 
with the secularization of the modern world, art increasingly became a place for sacral 
contemplation. Poetics took over the role of the sacred texts and museums replaced churches as 
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rooms for enlightenment and spiritual arousal. As entertainment connotes pleasure of the flesh and 
earthly desires, it came in opposition to art and sacred contemplation.  
 
Shusterman’s arguments primarily rely on 'sound reason', but as an introduction to his critique of 
Hannah Arendt's view on art and entertainment, the outlines of an underlying theory on play and 
aesthetic experience is hidden. He underscores that pleasure "stands out from the ordinary flow of 
perception as a special aesthetic experience (…) an experience that so absorbs our attention that it 
also constitutes an entertaining distraction from the humdrum routine of life". (Shusterman 2003, 
304).  The characteristics of pleasure as Shusterman pinpoints them here, mirrors the definition of 
play (e.g. Huizinga 1936). Entertainment/pleasure, we add, constitutes a break from everyday social 
routines in the same way as play, and activates an aesthetic perception mode, which creates new 
cultural experiences bound to movements in the moment – the here and now.  
 
Shusterman further claims that "pleasure is (…) inseparable from the activity in which it is 
experienced" (Shusterman 2003, 303).  When we interpret his work in the light of Play Theory, it 
involves a necessary dimension of active participation. If the activities are not framed and the break 
from social life not fulfilled, full and focused participation in, and pleasure from these experiences 
is not possible. Shusterman ends up with the special social dimension related to these kinds of 
framed cultural experiences. He claims that: "Aesthetic experience gains intensity from a sense of 
sharing something meaningful and valuable together and this includes the feeling of shared 
pleasures" (Shustermann 2003, 304).  
 
In his latest works, Shusterman argues that we need to consider the body as an inseparable part of 
all human perception. The body is a central part of human perception and performance, and should 
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be taken into consideration when we discuss art experience (Shusterman 2013). Shusterman has 
developed what he calls somaesthetics as an interdisciplinary field that unites the cognitive and 
sensuous perception:  
 
“Art enchants us through its richly sensuous dimensions, perceived through the bodily senses and 
enjoyed through embodied feelings. Yet philosophical aesthetics largely neglects the body’s role in 
aesthetic appreciation.” (Shusterman 2012, 1) “Building on the pragmatist insistence on the body’s 
central role in artistic creation and appreciation, somaesthetics highlights and explores the soma – 
the living, sentient, purposive body – as the indispensable medium for all perception.” (3) 
 
By emphasizing the bodily perception, Shusterman also challenges the great emphasis on 
interpretation and discourse in modern society and philosophy. In relation to modes of cognition, he 
suggests a distinction between understanding and interpretation, where understanding is related to 
immediacy and the unreflective, whereas interpretation is related to a more reflective form of 
perception (173). 
 
Shusterman is here in line with the literary scholar Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht who follows the same 
line of argument in his book Production of Presence. We are living in a world dominated by 
meaning, Gumbrecht argues, where interpretation and hermeneutics are a central part of how we 
think and talk about the world. The goal of his book is to “develop concepts that could allow us, in 
the Humanities, to relate to the world in a way that is more complex than interpretation alone, that is 
more complex than only attributing meaning to the world.” (Gumbrecht 2004, 52) 
In contrast to the widespread meaning culture, he introduces the concept of presence culture, a 
tangible, spatial, bodily perception of the world. As many of the others scholars included in this 
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article, he turns to medieval culture in order to find notions and understandings, which help him 
develop the concept of presence culture. He also includes several scholars, especially Martin 
Heidegger and his concept of Being-in-the-world (Dasein) as “human existence that is always 
already in – both spatial and functional – contact with the world” (71).  
Gumbrecht does not argue for a cancellation of the hermeneutic meaning culture, but suggests a 
balance between the different modes of perception and knowledge production. As with Dewey and 
Shusterman, Gumbrecht points to the aesthetic experience as an oscillation between presence 
effects and meaning effects. Gumbrecht relates the understanding of presence to concepts as 
moments of intensity and epiphany, and stresses that there is nothing edifying in such moments. 
Why then, do we seek and value aesthetic experiences, he asks? Because it gives us something 
which we cannot experience in our everyday world, because we lose control, and because our desire 
for presence is “an reaction to an everyday environment that has been become so overly Cartesian 
during the past centuries, it makes sense to hope that aesthetic experience may help us recuperate 
the spatial and bodily dimension of our existence (…).” (Gumbrecht 2004, 116) 
 
Both Shusterman and Gumbrecht argue that we need a new epistemology, and that we ultimately 
must secede from the legacy of Decartes. Another reason why this is not only interesting but also 
necessary in relation to cultural policy, cultural institutions and arts advocacy, is the development in 
the popular culture, more specific in new digital media.  
 
The digital challenges 
In the article Artistic Expression in the Age of Participatory Culture, media scholar Henry Jenkins 
and program manager Vanessa Bertozzi refer to "a series of interviews – conducted face to face, 
12 
 
with video, and over instant messaging, e-mail and phone – with seven young artists" (2008). They 
sum up the results of their studies as a new participatory culture:  
 
"A participatory culture might be defined as one where there are relatively low barriers to artistic 
expression and civic engagement, where there is strong support for creating and sharing what one 
creates with others, and where there is some kind of informal mentorship whereby what is known 
by the most experienced is passed along to novices. It is also a culture where members feel that 
their contribution matter and where they feel some degree of social connection with each other at 
least to the degree to which they care what other people think about what they have created.” 
(Jenkins & Bertozzi 2008, 174)  
 
Although this description does not differ from descriptions of children and young people's classical 
play cultures and playing communities, the authors conclude that these new participatory online 
communities and their experiences “may be reshaping what is meant by art and by participation in 
the twenty-first century.” (Jenkins and Bertozzi 2008, 175) The article serves as a warning for 
policy makers and cultural institutions. The online participatory culture is characterized by blurred 
lines between commercial and non-commercial art, between producer and user, between 
professional and amateur. According to the authors, arts institutions need to keep up with these 
changes, they need to redefine art, to redesign art worlds, to reconsider the digital and to remake 
arts institutions (Jenkins & Bertozzi 2008) 
 
What is going on in young peoples' creative and expressive online communities is not only 
considered a challenge, but a threat against the classic cultural institutions. Jenkins and Bertozzi's 
portrait and definition of these new types of participatory culture has been seen as both an 
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inspiration and a challenge by researchers. In the article In and Out of the Dark. A Theory about 
Audience Behavior from Sophocles to Spoken Word, theater scholar Lynne Conner identifies “an 
ever-widening interest gap between passive forms of high culture (…) and more active types of 
entertainment (…) that are either inherently participatory or are connected to opportunities that 
invite participation before and after the arts event.” (Conner 2008, 4) The gap means that the live 
arts have lost touch with the popular or mass audience: “In theatres and symphony halls across 
America, it is said; the audience has left the building” (2008, 103). In general, researchers' 
explanation for this development has pointed to a shift in consumer patterns. Conner does not 
support this explanation. “America audience”", she argues,”are very much as they have always 
been: looking for similar kinds of satisfaction from their cultural sources.” (2008, 103) What has 
changed are not taste and consumer patterns, but “the culture surrounding arts participation – what I 
label the arts experience” (2008, 103). Jenkins and Bertozzi are warning arts institutions, whereas 
Conner follows up with an explanation on the gap between passive forms of high culture and more 
active types of entertainment that point to the entire traditional arts industry. The industry, she 
claims, “has abandoned responsibility for providing – or even acknowledging – the importance of 
larger opportunities for engagement with arts events, particularly those that encourage an 
interpretive relationship” (Conner 2008, 104).  
 
In order to support this thesis and to develop new guidelines for the traditional arts industry, Conner 
takes her readers on an informed historical transformative journey. From the active participatory 
audiences in antiquity and during the Elizabethan Period, in which the quality and value of theater 
performances was a decision made by the participating audiences, to the development of the passive 
attending audiences dominating the 19th and 20th centuries. At that time professional reviewers of 
the press had the authority to choose, discuss, evaluate and recommend on behalf of the passive 
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audiences. Further to the future, she predicts the rise of new types of young active audiences that 
expect to co-author, interpret, discuss, negotiate, and evaluate meanings and values from the 
cultural experiences offered.  
The lesson she takes from the history of audience cultures and presents as a challenge to the non-
profit arts industry, is not just to reinvent and remake the old participative audience patterns. Such a 
return to former models is not possible, but some kind of institutional alignment would be 
necessary. According to Conner, the problem with existing attempts to create active involvement, is 
that they are based on the same us/them position as mentioned by Jensen (year), in which experts 
guide the illiterate.  
 
As with Jensen and Shusterman, Conner challenges both the former authority of the experts, the 
educational one-way communication form between experts and users/audiences, and the 
dichotomies between high and low art and culture. Her concept of late modern participatory 
audiences and her advice on opening possibilities for co-authorizing and cooperation between 
experts and users in cultural institutions are modeled on Jenkins and Bertozzi's definition of late 
modern young participatory cultures. 
 
“Today's consumption patterns make it clear that adult audiences – like their forebears - seek 
entertainment promoting the interplay of ideas, experience, information, feeling, and passion. They, 
too, seek the cognitive satisfaction that comes from the opportunity to formulate and express an 
opinion in a public context. Simply put, today's audiences are willing to spend their money and 
leisure time on live entertainment that puts them in the position to participate in, through and 
around the arts event itself.” (Conner 2008, 117) (…) “To compete in the cultural marketplace of 
the twenty-first century, the non-profit live arts community must concede that an audience-driven 
15 
 
cultural transformation is already under way – with or without permission or approval. American 
audiences of the twenty-first century, especially younger patrons, are busily and happily engaged in 
the process of redemocratizing the arts.” (2008, 120) 
 
Both Jenkins & Bertozzi and Conner draw our attention to the change in cultural behavior caused 
by new digital media. The digitalization and the mobility of media has resulted in a democratization 
of culture in relation to art forms, taste, creativity and production. Online activities allow people not 
only to have access to all kinds of artwork but also to use the technology to remix and interact with 
both high and popular art. People participate because it is fun, it is entertaining, and it creates value 
for them in their everyday lives. Moreover, and most importantly, it takes place without any 
gatekeepers telling people what to do. In our opinion, this does not mean that people necessarily 
should have the same opportunities in cultural institutions, but it means that people have a different 
approach to art and culture and to the role it plays in their lives.  
 
Expressive lives – towards a new form of cultural democracy  
Both Jenkins & Bertozzi and Conner’s articles stem from the volume Engaging Art. The Next Great 
Transformation of America's Cultural Life, edited by Steven J. Tepper, professor of art and design 
at Vanderbilt University, and Bill Ivey, folklorist and former chairman of the National Endowment 
for the Arts. In his introduction to the volume, Bill Ivey stresses that: “the volume is an attempt to 
address the question of how to better understand the changing landscape of cultural participation.” 
(Ivey 2008,2) “How have technological, cultural and demographic changes affected non-profits, and 
how might they respond to contemporary challenges? (…) How can we best conceptualize 
participation to make art, art making, and connections with art organizations part as a high quality 
of life for all Americans?” (Ivey 2008, 9)    
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Bill Ivey has in several publications been occupied with these questions and offers a concept, which 
seems productive for us, “expressive lives”. In his contribution to the British cross-party think tank 
Demos pamphlet, "Expressive Lives," (2009) he characterizes the term expressive lives as “nothing 
new under the sun:”  
 
“The phrase draws in part on my training as a folklorist and the sense of community, heritage, 
connectedness and history, embodied in the folklorists' sense of tradition. Thus 'heritage' constitutes 
one half of expressive life: the part that is about belonging, continuity, community and history; it is 
expressed through art and ideas grounded in family, neighborhood, ethnicity, nationality and the 
many linkages that provide securing knowledge that we come from a specific place and are not 
alone. 'Voice', the other half of our expressive life, is quite different: a realm of individual 
expression where we can be autonomous, personally accomplished and cosmopolitan – a space in 
which we can at times even challenge the conventions of community or family heritage. (…) 
'Heritage' reminds us that we belong, 'voice' offers the promise of what we can become.” (Ivey 
2009, 27)   
 
Ivey coins the term 'expressive life' as a critique of the famous concept of culture created by the 
British cultural critic, Raymond Williams. Williams defined the concept of culture as the dialectic 
between two notions of culture: the anthropological notion encompassing the whole way of life 
(heritage, traditions, and habits) and the aesthetic notion denoting fine arts (culture with capital C).  
Ivey's problem with this concept in a cultural policy context is first, that users and their experiences 
with and within the arts are excluded from the equation. Secondly, he considers Williams’ notion of 
the arts to be experimental, and argues that it excludes experiences with and participation in popular 
arts and culture. Ivey’s answer to the challenge is to reframe the dialectic. He places art and culture 
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as part of the anthropological notion as 'heritage' and he places peoples ‘voices’ as the activity that 
ensures and qualifies meaning with art and culture in everyday life.  
 
In the Demos pamphlet "Expressive Lives" (2009) the editor and head of culture at the British think 
tank Demos, Samuel Jones, summarizes the challenges created by 'expressive life' and the possible 
perspectives on a cultural policy level. Agreeing with Lynne Conner, he claims that “We use new-
found powers of access to do things we have always liked doing. New and older forms of behavior 
and preferences are part of the same continuum.” (Jones 2009, 9) He takes as a prerequisite that 
“Technologies and the invigorated will of the public to participate, shape and personalize have 
changed the nature of cultural engagement.” (2009, 9) The combination of the same preferences and 
this new will not only to attend, but also to participate challenge both cultural policy and the 
cultural institutions. Both have to move from a model of provision to a model of enabling.  
 
“If our cultural policy and institutions do not facilitate expression by enabling us to participate in 
shaping and personalizing the culture of which we are a part, then they miss the point. Rather than 
simply communicating our culture and our heritage, our cultural and creative policy and institutions 
should help us to make use of them and create new values for the present and the future.” (Jones 
2009, 10) 
 
Consequently, this renewed cultural policy will have the potential: 1) to reestablish the meanings 
and values of art and culture in everyday life; and 2) to restore the meaning of cultural democracy to 
society. 
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“From the foods that we eat, to the images that we see, cultural forms and the creative choices we 
make are expressions of what we value and how we see the world. Like no other, the cultural and 
creative sector reflects and generates the values that make up our society.” (Jones 2009, 11) 
 
Ivey, Jenkins & Bertozzi, Conner, Shusterman, and Gumbrecht all find inspiration and 
understanding in history in order to identify cultural conceptions, which are not only adequate with 
todays mediatized and digitized culture, but that also help us reconceptualize art and culture as 
something that is valuable in everyday life.  They take their point of departure from a time, when  
culture was part of everyday life, or from an understanding of culture (folk culture) where culture 
and participation were inseparable. Ivey’s notion of expressive lives connects history, community 
and belonging (heritage) with individual lives in the present. In our point of view, ‘Voice’ 
represents the individual, who is participating in cultural activities and drawing meanings and 
values from the heritage, which makes sense in his or her life. The challenge seems to be that the 
development in society, caused by emerging media formats, gradually has created a more nuanced 
and appreciative view on all kinds of art forms, on crossover formats, fora for participation, and 
ways of creating meaning. Still, these same developments have not found their way into arts 
education, art criticism and art institutions to the same degree as in popular culture.  
 
Discussion 
We started out intending to develop a new understanding of culture and cultural democracy, which 
could function as an argument that cultural experiences are valuable in themselves. Our goal was to 
contribute to the decomposition of the instrumental logic that still characterizes cultural policy and 
cultural advocacy. In this concluding paragraph, we would like to summarize and discuss some 
points in our argument.  
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First, this call for change in the way we understand and practice cultural policy and advocacy is 
closely linked to technological developments. Not because people necessarily expect tablets and 
touch screens at museum, but because our perceptions, cognitions and behaviour changes according 
to the new modes of engagement enabled by new digital media. Both Jenkins & Bertozzi and 
Conner (and many others) points to this fact. As argued by Conner, it is not the culture itself, but 
rather the culture surrounding us that has changed. This change in behaviour does not only apply to 
young boys playing computer games. It applies to all of us, for whom interaction, entertainment, 
play and connectedness, is a part of our everyday life. Moreover, this digital culture is for the most 
part a culture that takes place outside educational institutions, outside cultural institutions, and 
without gatekeepers and mediators. It is an interconnected, peer-driven participatory culture, which 
is voluntary and pleasurable. While this new media culture may seem modern, it bears many 
similarities with earlier forms of culture characterised by pleasure, interaction, participation, 
collaboration and community. We need to consider this culture and develop cultural policies and 
arts advocacies that allow some of the same kinds of interaction and collaboration, which 
characterize media culture. We need to acknowledge the way in which media culture creates values 
in people’s lives, and develop ways in which all forms of art and culture can reassume a central 
position in our lives. 
 
Many of the scholars we have included in the article draw inspiration from historical examples or 
from folk culture in order to find comparable cultural communities. They seek times and places 
when participation and perception was integrated into everyday life, and when the ideas of 
entertainment, movement, body and activity were embedded into definitions of culture. John Dewey 
and his concept of art as experience is central to our argument. Dewey emphasizes that the 
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experience that happens between the subject and the artwork, is the work of art (Dewey 2005, 1). 
What Dewey—and the scholars quoted above—argues, is that in their view, aesthetic experiences 
are characterised by combining cognitive and sensuous perceptions. Further, the aesthetic 
experience takes place outside of everyday life, not as a sacral experience, but as something, which 
is situationally framed. Finally, aesthetic experiences are meaningful and valuable, intensely 
experienced, and ones to which we surrender. Gumbrecht and Shusterman would say that we lose 
ourselves for a moment. This definition of aesthetic experience is not necessarily connected to art, 
which many of scholars also stresses, and, in relation to the media argument, could just as readily be 
applied to computer games or participation in online communities. What we can learn from the 
concept of aesthetic experience, is an emphasis on both the framed situation in which it takes place, 
and the degree of absorption or immersion which characterise the experience.  
 
Finally, the entertaining approach to aesthetic experiences draw our attention to the very moment 
and mode of perception. Both Shusterman and Gumbrecht argue that we need to consider the 
aesthetic experience (the presence effect) as a non-hermeneutic condition, which we experience 
with our body and senses. Aesthetic experiences are not a cognitive interpretive activity alone. As 
participants, we are always in-the world, participating with our body, mind, and with all of our 
senses. The insistence that the body is a central part of the experience, invites cultural institutions to 
stimulate not only the mind and the cognitive perception mode, but to include communicative and 
narrative strategies, which stimulate all senses. Here it is important to point out that both Dewey, 
Shusterman and Gumbrech view aesthetic experiences as a combination of presence and meaning, 
of understanding and interpretation, and of mind and body. They do not dismiss the interpretive 
approach, but insist on the sensuous bodily perception as being not only relevant, but significant for 
the art experience if it is to have meaning in our lives.  
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In summary, we suggest that the concept of expressive cultural democracy unifies different 
concepts of culture and not only acknowledges but further stimulates an integrated use and 
understanding of high and popular culture. Better still, this works for a cultural sector, in which 
hierarchies are non-existent. However, an expressive understanding of culture also means that art 
and cultural institutions must create mental space for people to not only create their own meaning, 
but also create opportunities to use the ‘heritage’ as a foundation for creating values in our everyday 
lives.  Finally, an expressive cultural democracy acknowledges both body and mind as vehicles for 
aesthetic experiences.  An expressive cultural democracy is thus a mental expansion of cultural 
democracy, which allows people to create meaning in cultural activities in relation to their own life 
and their own creative activities inside so-called high culture institutions. Accordingly, cultural 
institutions and their collections should be seen as, and organized according to a democratic 
platform for exchanging and negotiating meaning, as arenas in which both heritage and voice can 
interact. 
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